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1. Summary  
Transitions away from fossil fuels and other carbon-intensive industries involve a range of 
dynamic social, political, economic, and environmental factors at international, national, regional 
and local levels. Coordination and participation within and across these levels is a very 
challenging but critical component of just transitions. Many national governments, state-owned 
and private enterprises, trade unions, civil society organisations and individuals have committed 
to carbon emission reduction targets and adopted just transition principles into their strategies to 
shift away from carbon-intensive energy production and consumption. This report reviews some 
of the available evidence on the effectiveness of these strategies, summarising global and cross-
country analyses and examining transitions in five low- and middle-income countries (LICs and 
MICS): Egypt, India, Indonesia, Mozambique, and South Africa.  
This report begins with a brief background to the concept of just energy transitions and outlines 
the basic principles and key frameworks developed to chart the suggested pathways for 
countries to achieve their stated goals. Section three presents findings from a rapid review of just 
transitions in the five country cases selected for this report. Section four summarises the priority 
areas identified by the country cases and available global and cross-country evidence for 
effective just energy transitions. These priority areas are: 
• Political Economy Analysis: There is no single blueprint for just transitions. Political 
economy analysis, from international to local level, is needed to understand the unique 
factors in each area affected by decarbonisation policies. 
• Relevant framing for LICs and MICs: The language and conceptual framing of just 
energy transitions have been largely developed for high-income settings but the 
decarbonisation pathways of LICs and MICs are fundamentally different. As a result, little 
traction on just transitions has been recorded in the global South.  
• Coordination of energy strategies: Government coordination of just transitions and 
energy planning more generally is inadequate in all contexts reviewed for this report. 
Conflicting policies aiming to appease both fossil fuel and clean energy demands are 
found to lead to ineffective outcomes, often with the fossil fuel energy sector benefiting 
from these inconsistencies.  
• Power differentials among stakeholders: While active and informed participation 
among all affected stakeholders is considered a key principle of just transitions, it is 
rarely pursued in energy strategies and, where it is pursued, effects are often limited. All 
five country case studies show that the fossil fuel sector yields more power in political 
decision-making than the renewable sector, trade unions and civil society. 
• Gender inequalities hinder progress: women are disproportionately affected by energy 
poverty in LICs and MICs and harmful gender norms limit women’s participation in the 
energy labour market. Gender does not feature in many energy strategies; therefore, a 
major component of ‘justice’ is missing from just transitions.  
Based on these factors, some overarching recommendations can be derived from the literature 
that, while still needing to be tailored to specific sectors and local contexts, can be effective in 
experiences of just transitions in LICs and MICs to date: 
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• Decentralised approaches: Due to the regional and localised nature of energy 
opportunities and challenges, many authors highly rate decentralised processes for just 
transitions. While international coordination and national-level planning are still critical, 
“there can be different approaches to implementation and financing across different 
ministries, shaped by different political priorities and capacity levels” (Worrall et al., 2018, 
p.14).  
• Effective communication: It is a common perception that divestment from fossil fuels 
necessitates significant social and economic sacrifice. While there are trade-offs inherent 
in just energy transitions, the goal is to achieve net benefits for societies at large. 
“Communicating in a credible way about the reasons for and benefits of transitions—and 
being forthright about the challenges—is key to building support and finding well-adapted 
solutions” (Zinecker et al., 2018, p. 10). 
• Financial and social capital to support marginalised voices: A leading cause of the 
major disparities in access to, and influence over, decision-making in energy strategies is 
the disproportionate access to financial and social capital in the fossil fuel industry.  
“Gender-responsive and socially inclusive energy businesses lack access to capital. 
Donors have a role to play not just via their check books, they are supporting impact 
investments and convening" (SEforALL, 2017). 
The majority of available evidence on just energy transitions is focused on high-income settings, 
and detailed analysis of just transitions in lower-income settings is limited to a small set of upper-
income countries (China, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia) and India among lower middle-income 
countries. Mozambique was identified as a focus for this report to ensure the inclusion of a lower-
income context, but evidence of the experience of just transitions in LICs is very limited. This 
finding was recently confirmed at a roundtable hosted by the Center for Strategic Studies and the 
Climate Investment Fund where the leading recommendation following the discussion was that 
“detailed case studies on sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and developing Asia are needed to 
provide policymakers tailored guidance and recommendations” (CSIS, 2020).  There is a need 
for further evidence, for example, on critical factors in just transitions for those countries with high 
proportions of the population living in extreme poverty and limited capacity to increase clean 
energy production but have new or emerging fossil fuel sectors.  
It is also worth noting that the research reviewed for this report did not address the potential 
diversion of CO2 emissions from energy production in upper-middle income countries to lower-
income countries. For example, it was noted that China and India are investing heavily in coal 
production in Mozambique. At the same time, most jobs in renewables are being generated in 
higher-income countries. There may be further scope to study the international coordination of 
divestment efforts and the emerging global structure of employment in clean energy sectors as 
LICs may be at risk of being left behind in the global energy transition.  
2. Background to Just Energy Transitions 
Just energy transitions are a negotiated process to achieve fair economic, social, and 
environmental outcomes from a shift away from carbon-intensive production and 
consumption (Zinecker et al., 2018). “The concept [of just energy transitions] provides a 
shorthand for talking about protecting workers and communities affected by transitions away 
from damaging industries and ensuring that a new “green economy” brings decent work, 
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improves human well-being, and addresses widening social and economic inequalities” (Piggot 
et al., 2019, p.3). Ongoing just energy transition processes focus largely on shifts away from oil, 
gas and coal production and consumption due to these sectors’ large share of CO2 emissions 
(Piggot et al., 2019; Zinecker et al., 2018). Other carbon-intensive industries such as cement, 
glass, steel, and ceramics have also been incorporated into just energy transition process, 
largely due to their high energy demands for production (OECD, 2017).  
Employment and economic security are critical considerations for the majority of 
stakeholders involved in just energy transitions. “Energy transitions often involve a 
restructuring of economies and labour markets, and some sectors will witness a contraction and 
others an expansion in employment (Zinecker et al., 2018, p.2). While shifts towards renewable 
energy sources are expected to generate net gains in employment, these jobs are not 
guaranteed to be in the same regions as job losses due to divestment and the skills required 
from these jobs will likely differ (ILO, 2018; Cooper, 2019). The global distribution of new 
employment in renewable energy is also heavily skewed. Of the 11 million jobs globally in 
renewable energy reported by the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) in 2018, 
China accounted for 39%. 
The ILO (2015) developed seven principles for just transitions that are widely cited in the 
literature and have been translated into national and regional policies. In brief, these are:  
• Adequate, informed social dialogue among all relevant stakeholders.  
• Respect, promotion and realisation of fundamental principles and rights at work. 
• Specific gender policies to promote equitable outcomes. 
• Coherent policies need to provide an enabling environment for enterprises, workers, 
investors and consumers to embrace and drive the transition.  
• The creation of more decent jobs, including as appropriate: anticipating impacts on 
employment, adequate and sustainable social protection, skills development and social 
dialogue, including the effective exercise of the right to organize and bargain collectively. 
• Policies need to be designed in line with the specific conditions of countries. 
• International cooperation among countries should be fostered. 
Piggot et al. (2019) highlight two dimensions of justice central to just energy transitions: 
distributive justice and procedural justice. Procedural justice refers to the inclusion of all 
individuals and groups affected by divestment into decision-making around energy transition 
planning. They suggest this include potential impacts on future generations as well as justice for 
those historically affected by energy development. Distributive justice, they argue, refers to the 
equitable distribution of costs and benefits resulting from energy transitions and leads to 
questions and tensions that must be negotiated, such as: 
“Which coal mines, oil fields and gas reserves should close first; who should be 
compensated for losses;  how can transition planning account for non-financial losses 
such as loss of culture or identity associated with industry closure; what types of 
assistance is needed; and how should support across companies, workers, households 
and communities be distributed to ensure that the existing unequal relations of gender, 
race, class, age and ability are not exacerbated?”      
                                                                              (Piggot et al., 2019, p.3-4) 
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There is wide agreement in the literature that there is no single blueprint to just 
transitions as needs will vary based on structures within different industries, workforce 
composition, local social factors and dynamic political economy factors (Bataille et al., 
2016; CSIS, 2020; Piggot et al., 2019; OECD, 2017; Price, 2020; Worrall et al., 2018; Zinecker et 
al., 2018). Furthermore, much theorising and assessment of energy transitions have been 
focused on high-income countries with distinctively different opportunities and constraints from 
LICs and MICs (Power et al., 2016). High-income countries are focused on changes to power 
production, the redesign of grids and efficiency of consumption while LICs and MICs are focused 
on clean electricity generation, the sustainable use of biomass and equitable access to clean 
energy (Fankhauser & Jotzo, 2017). Power et al. (2016) note, for example, that the emphasis on 
‘bottom-up’ approaches to technological innovations employed in many European contexts is 
less straightforward in contexts where multinational firms yield a disproportionately high influence 
in energy systems. Even the language used to depict just transitions varies widely; Morena 
(2018) notes that “while just transition has gained traction in the international policy space and 
the global North, apart from a few notable exceptions (…) it is rarely referred to in the global 
south”.  
The emerging economies reviewed in this report are less prepared for just transitions 
than other emerging economies. Worrall et al. (2018) propose an analytical framework for just 
transitions based on three pillars (macroeconomic and sectoral policies, employment, social 
policies) and two enabling factors (policy coherence and effective institutional arrangement, 
social dialogue). Based on this framework they have assessed 16 emerging economies 
according to their preconditions for a just transition using relevant global indicators (see Figure 
1). Brazil, China and South Korea rank highest according to their ranking, while the countries 
covered in this report that feature in their analysis on the lower end of their ranking (Egypt, India, 
Indonesia, South Africa). 
 
See: Figure 1: Emerging economies’ pre-conditions for just energy transition, Source: Worrall et al. (2018, p.19), 
https://www.sustainablefinance.hsbc.com/carbon-transition/enabling-a-just-transition-to-a-low-carbon-economy-
in-the-energy-sector  
 
3. Country case studies 
Egypt 
Egypt has the second-highest total CO2 emissions in Africa and the energy sector makes 
up (71%) of total emissions with agriculture, industrial processes and waste making up the 
remaining 10%, 10% and 9% respectively (Ritchie, 2019; CAIT, 2019). Although Egypt’s per 
capita emissions are high by African standards 2.43 tonnes per year in 2018, they are nearly half 
the global average of 4.79 tonnes per year (Ritchie, 2019). Fossil fuel subsidies have been a 
defining feature of Egypt’s energy sector, amounting to an estimated $US27 billion in 2018 (IEA, 
2019). Despite major subsidy reforms, Egypt’s fossil fuel subsidies were the seventh highest in 
the world in 2018 (IEA, 2020a). Egypt is the largest non-OPEC oil producer and third-largest 
natural gas producer in Africa (EIA, 2018). Egypt is also a leading cement producer with energy 
provided by subsidised oil being increasingly replaced by coal (Vanderborght et al., 2016). 
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Policy context 
Egypt’s leading decarbonisation strategy has been fuel subsidy reforms, initiated in 2014 
to reduce the significant burden on state expenditure. Leading up to these reforms, fuel 
subsidies accounted for around 20% of all government expenditure and disproportionately 
benefited high-income households (Canonage et al., 2016; UNFCC, 2016). It was also estimated 
that the removal of fossil fuel subsidies could lead to a 13% reduction in the country’s CO2 
emissions, therefore the strategy was seen as mutually beneficial for the economy and for the 
environment (ILO, 2018). Fuel subsidy reforms were predicted to have a larger negative impact 
on poorer households given their relatively higher share of income spent on energy and lack of 
access to fuel substitutes (Canonage et al., 2016). To compensate for these negative effects the 
government introduced a series of complimentary social protection measures (UNFCC, 2016). 
The range of social protection measures adopted with explicit links to Egypt’s fuel 
subsidy reforms have been a turning point in the government’s commitments towards a 
social protection floor for poor households. The Egyptian government committed to re-
allocate between 10-15% of the estimated savings from fuel subsidy reforms on new social 
programmes and the extension of existing programmes. These measures included the 
introduction of two new cash transfer programmes, an increase to the minimum wage, the 
extension of existing food subsidy measures, fuel supplies to reduce shortages and free public 
transportation (Zinecker et al., 2018).  
Participation in Egypt’s just transition 
Egypt’s fuel subsidy reforms were championed by the newly elected Sisi government 
shortly after coming into power with strong public support (Zinecker et al., 2018). Following 
years of political and economic turmoil, the Arab Spring protests and unsuccessful government 
transitions, the country’s fiscal situation had reached a critical point. Unemployment was high, 
and Egypt was at risk of defaulting on its debts (Zinecker et al., 2018). Given the significant 
burden of fuel subsidies on public spending, their reform came to be seen as an essential part of 
Egypt’s return to economic stability. “Sisi relied on a predominantly technocratic cabinet which 
was universally in favour of energy price increases. This fostered internal government 
coordination” (Zinecker et al., 2018, p.29). 
The Sisi government had broad-based support for fuel subsidy reforms from academics, 
businesses, industry, the media, wealthy elite and much of the middle-class population 
(Zinecker et al., 2018). Although many of these groups were benefiting from fuel subsidies, a 
narrative of ‘shared sacrifice’ was developed around the notion of building a workable economy 
for the Egyptian people (Zinecker et al., 2018, p.30). Opposition did arise to the reforms, mainly 
around potential impacts on poor households and among the transport sector. The government 
responded to these concerns by focusing its messaging on social equity and making explicit links 
between cost savings and new social protection spending (Zinecker et al. 2018). 
Achievements towards just transition 
The reallocation of government spending from fossil fuel subsidies to new social 
protection programmes has allowed the government to develop a social safety net that 
had been historically neglected (Canonage, 2016; Zinecker et al., 2018). There is limited 
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evidence on the effectiveness of these programmes, but it has been suggested that “by using a 
flat transfer amount, rather than progressively smaller transfers… [the cash transfer 
programmes] could constitute an expansion of social protection in the country, rather than simply 
a transitional offsetting measure during the subsidy removal process” (Canonage, 2016).   
One of the key factors noted behind Egypt’s relatively successful fuel subsidy reforms 
has been coordination, both of public messaging around the reforms and in ministerial 
approaches and activities (Zinecker et al., 2018)  
“Clarity and consistency about the urgency of reforms to revive the Egyptian economy 
were crucial in fostering cohesion both within government and the population… This was 
paired with communications strategies that explained how energy subsidies 
disproportionally benefited wealthier households… [and] strongly addressed the belief 
systems of middle- and lower-class Egyptians.” 
         (Zinecker et al., 2018 p.30). 
Remaining challenges 
Beyond fuel subsidy reform, Egypt has made limited progress in reducing carbon 
emissions from the energy sector. While the country has significant potential to shift energy 
production to renewable sources, funding to support renewable industries has been lacking 
(IRENA, 2018). The government has set a target to reach 42% renewables in the country’s 
energy mix by 2035, but the share of renewables in total electricity output has been in sharp 
decline from 17% in 2000 to 8% in 2015 (World Bank, 2020). The government’s energy strategy, 
developed in 2014, is due to be revised as it has not been updated to account for changes in the 
renewable energy sector (IRENA, 2018). 
Egypt’s fuel subsidies are still disproportionately high, and Egypt has the lowest 
spending on social safety nets as a % of GDP in North Africa and the Middle East and one 
of the lowest rates in Africa (World Bank, 2018). Evidence on the effectiveness of Egypt’s 
diversion of fuel subsidy spending towards social protection programmes is needed. A better 
understanding of the effectiveness of these programmes in mitigating the negative impacts of 
fuel subsidies on poor households could be used to help extend these reforms further and to 
maintain public support.  
India 
India has taken several steps to reduce carbon emissions, but coal, oil and natural gas 
still make up 80% of its electricity (ILO, 2018, p.14) While India has maintained relatively low 
CO2 emissions per capita compared to the global average, total emissions makeup 6.8% of all 
global emissions and are therefore critical to meeting global targets (Ritchie & Roser, 2019). 
India is the second-largest coal producer (IEA, 2020b), second-largest steel producer (World 
Steel Association, 2020) and second-largest cement producer (Müller, N. & Harnisch, 2007). 
India also maintains relatively high subsidies for fossil fuels. Given India’s persistently high 
poverty rate and the large number of households reliant on fossil fuel industries for their 
livelihoods, an effective and inclusive just energy transition will be crucial to India’s divestment 
process. Significant regional variation and marked differences between rural and urban areas will 
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also mean that this transition will require tailored local and regional strategies to interact with 
national strategies. 
Policy context 
India submitted an Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) under the United 
Nations Framework on Climate Change (UNFCC) in 2015. INDCs detail a country’s emission 
reduction ambitions and set them in local contexts. INDCs are expected to follow just transition 
principles such as those listed by ILO above, notably around social dialogue, transparency and 
equity. India’s INDC targets have been rated ‘2°C compatible by the Climate Action Tracker, 
meaning they are consistent with the 2009 Copenhagen 2°C goal, but are not fully consistent 
with the Paris Agreement’s long-term temperature goal (Climate Action Tracker, 2020). 
“India’s climate-related policies have been heavily influenced by concerns over climate 
change adaptation, secure energy access and job creation, while emission reductions are 
seen as a co-benefit to these aims” (Roz, p.15). A defining feature of India’s energy strategy is 
investment in renewable energy production with a commitment to reach 40% electricity 
production from renewable sources. India has seen a sharp increase in both domestic and 
foreign investment in renewable energy targeted at solar, wind, electric vehicles and storage 
(Sinha, 2020). The attraction of foreign investment from multilateral and bilateral agencies and 
sovereign wealth funds has been attributed to “a conducive policy environment, a steady influx of 
capital, falling prices and new technology (Sinha, 2020).     
The building sector has been identified as a priority area in reducing India’s carbon 
emissions given projected growth in the sector, largely through more efficient energy use 
(Graham & Rawal, 2019). The sector is estimated to contribute 35% of India’s total energy 
consumption and to be increasing by 8% annually (Khosla & Janda, 2018). Initiatives listed in 
India’s INDC with regards to the building sector include: minimum energy standards for new 
commercial buildings; design guidelines for energy efficiency; an energy-rating system; an 
increase in green building floor area (Graham & Rawal, 2019).  
Participation in India’s just transition 
A large number of jobs are directly and indirectly tied to the fossil fuel industry in India 
and are concentrated in regions of the country that are not targeted for renewable energy 
production expansion. The state-owned coal company CIL has around 300,000 employees and 
it is estimated that 1,210,000 labourers are linked with formal and informal coal production 
(Zinecker et al., 2018, p.20).  
Trade unions representing workers in affected industries and communities have been 
actively engaged around government energy decisions. While the government has “widened 
the scope of continuous engagement of consultations among the stakeholders for inclusive 
labour policy formulation at regional and state levels” (Ministry of Labour and Employment, cited 
in Worrall et al, 2019, p.19) it was not possible to identify evidence on the mechanisms 
supporting these efforts or on their effectiveness. A cross-country study of participation in just 
transitions in emerging economies by Worrall et al. (2018) noted that civil society has had limited 
access to decision-making around energy transitions in all of the cases they studied, including 
India, but no further analysis is provided. 
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Achievements towards just transition 
The renewable energy sector in India is estimated to have created 719,000 jobs as of 2018, 
making it the fifth-largest employer for renewables in the world (IRENA, 2019). The leading 
renewable sectors for employment are hydropower, grid-connected solar power and wind 
(IRENA, 2019). Growth in the sector has been largely attributed to strong domestic and 
international investment. One innovative domestic financing mechanism has been the 
introduction of a tax on coal production that yielded US$12 billion in revenues between 2010-
2018. These revenues have been partially used to fund renewable energy technologies (Zinecker 
et al., 2018, p.15)   
Social protection measures such as the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) have been used for the dual purpose of economic security for 
rural households and climate-resilient infrastructure investment (ILO, 2018; Worrall et al., 
2018). “People are employed in unskilled manual work, such as the construction or improvement 
of community infrastructure, or the generation of ecosystem services that protect environmental 
resources” (ILO, 2018, p.11). The scheme guarantees minimum wage employment for 
marginalised workers for 100 days per year and is seen as possible protection for workers in 
carbon-intensive industries (Worrall et al., 2018 p.9).  
Regional and city-level actions have been taken to fulfil India’s commitments towards 
improved energy efficiency in the building sector. “Hyderabad recently implement[ed] India’s 
first online building code compliance system … while the cities of Coimbatore, Rajkot Nagpur 
and Shimla have committed to improving their rates of energy-efficiency improvement” (Graham 
& Rawal, 2019). The Energy Conversation Building Code, launched in 2007, is now mandatory in 
10 of India’s 29 states. (Graham & Rawal, 2019) 
Targeted government subsidies for clean cooking fuels have yielded positive outcomes 
for women in poor households (GSI-IISD & IRADe, 2019). As the primary cooks in many 
households in India, women are more exposed to indoor air pollution and suffer drudgery and 
time burdens from non-renewable energy sources. One study found that women targeted by the 
subsidies saved one hour on average per day due to reduced cooking and cleaning time and 
gained decision-making power within the household (GSI-IISD & IRADe, 2019).  
Remaining challenges 
There has been inadequate decentralised energy planning to address regional imbalances 
in fossil fuel dependence for jobs and indirect economic linkages (Zinecker et al., 2018). 
“Most of the coal resources are located in the eastern and central states of Jharkhand, 
Odisha, Chhattisgarh, West Bengal and Madhya Pradesh (Geological Survey of India, 
2018). In comparison, most of the planned new renewable energy capacity is 
concentrated in southern, western and northern regions of India. While solar and 
biomass can be deployed in almost all states, wind energy is concentrated in a few states 
in southern and western India (NITI Aayog, 2015).  
                                                   Zinecker et al., 2018, p.20  
In addition to decentralised planning, national coordination has been cited as a barrier to 
India’s energy transition (Price, 2019; Kumar & Naik, 2019). Kumar & Naik (2019) argue that 
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there are persistent challenges to finding a synergy between India’s climate and development 
interests, and that “institutional, systemic and process barriers, including financial constraints, 
inter-ministerial coordination, lack of technical expertise and project clearance delays, stand as 
major challenges in the efficient implementation of the missions”. 
India continues to invest in carbon-intensive energy production in other countries, 
suggesting that analyses focused solely on domestic accountability for just energy 
transitions is an insufficient measure of the advancement of the global position. While this 
issue was not raised in the literature assessing the effectiveness of India’s energy transition, 
India’s investments in South Africa and Mozambique were identified when exploring just energy 
transitions in those countries for this report. Power et al. (2016) note that India is a significant 
export market for South Africa’s coal and that India has been stepping up its diplomatic efforts in 
Mozambique’s natural resource industries, particularly around new coal and gas discoveries.  
Indonesia 
Indonesia’s reliance on fossil fuels has been driven by complex social and political 
factors at national, regional and local levels. The country is the fourth-largest coal producer 
(IEA, 2020b) and a leading producer of cement, ceramics, and other intensive industries. While 
Indonesia has made notable strides in consumption-side reforms to reduce carbon emissions, far 
less has been done to curb production-side emissions. “Fossil fuels still make up around 67% of 
Indonesia’s energy mix (including power, heat, transport fuels, etc) and their share is increasing 
further [while] the use of renewables has remained stable over the years at a fairly low level” 
(Climate Transparency, 2019). Regional-level factors and the country’s relatively decentralised 
governance system are important characteristics to be accounted for as part of a just energy 
transition. Carbon emission levels, economic and social structures, and levels of commitment to 
divestment vary widely across the country’s 34 provinces. CO2 emissions range from 260 Mt CO2 
e in North Sumatera to 1.51Mt CO2 e in West Sulawesi (CAIT, 2016). 
Policy context 
Indonesia’s 2030 INDC targets have been found to be “highly Insufficient”, mainly due to 
limited ambition in the country’s targets for CO2 emission reductions (Climate Action 
Tracker, 2020; Chrysolite et al., 2017). The Government’s latest medium-term development plan 
has set more ambitious targets, notably around increasing renewable energy production, but as 
yet there are no policies in place to meet these targets (Climate Action Tracker, 2017). Analysis 
by IRENA (2017) shows that Indonesia could greatly expand renewable energy production with 
the potential to create an estimated 1.3 million jobs (up from 100,000 in 2017) by increasing 
investment and policy efforts in the sector (IRENA, 2017). 
Indonesia’s leading fossil fuel divestment strategy has been to reform consumption-side 
fuel subsidies. Fuel subsidies have posed a significant burden on government expenditure, 
upwards of 10% in the years leading up to reforms, and low fuel prices for consumers have led to 
overconsumption, with benefits largely accrued by wealthier households (Zinecker et al., 2018) 
The policy, introduced in 2014, introduced a formula for price adjustments that are closer to the 
international market price and ensure more regular price adjustments (Gass & Echeverria, 2017). 
The ‘one fuel price’ policy also targets remote areas to ensure that fuel prices there match those 
in urban areas. (Zinecker et al., 2018).  
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There have been provincial and district-level initiatives setting further divestment targets 
that go beyond national-level. The National Action Plan for Greenhouse Gas Reduction (RAN-
GRK) requires the provincial government to create Local Action Plans for Greenhouse Gas 
Reduction (RAD-GRK). “Since 2010, more than 12,000 mitigation actions have taken place in the 
provinces under RAD-GRK, leading to almost 3GtCO2e in emissions reduction” (NewClimate 
Institute, 2019). The island of Sumba in East Nusa Tanagra province has set a particularly 
ambitious target of 100% renewable energy (no fixed date) and gained support from the Ministry 
of Energy and Mineral Resources as well as international donors (Hivos, n.d.).   
Participation in Indonesia’s just transition 
The national government, led by President Jokowi, has champion fuel subsidy reforms, 
following campaign commitments in the lead up to the 2014 presidential election (Zinecker 
et al., 2018). Jokowi’s administration has been credited with having a clear and effective 
communication strategy around fuel subsidy reforms, highlighting the benefits of reforms to build 
public support and linking cost savings to diverted spending on infrastructure, education and 
health (Zinecker, 2018, p.27).   
“The government strongly communicated on all the newly built infrastructures, funding to 
villages, economic progress, and other benefits of reform, mostly through commercials 
and social media. This method of communication [was] most effective among people 
living in the cities with good access to information and relatively higher levels of 
education, but less so in rural areas with less access to these channels.”  
        Zinecker et al., 2018, p.27 
Achievements towards just transition 
While fuel subsidy savings cannot be directly linked to improved social and economic 
outcomes, analysis has shown that investments in social sectors increased in the 
following budget period (Gass & Echeverria, 2017). Targeted social protection measures such 
as food subsidies and health insurance assistance were linked with fuel subsidy reforms as part 
of a broader reorientation of public spending (UNFCC, 2016, p.49). 
“Massive programs were implemented together with the reforms. They did not target 
workers specifically but stimulated economic growth and rural development. The Revised 
State Budget 2015 showed marked increases in expenditure in three main areas: 
economic and social programs, infrastructure and regional transfer funds.” 
Zinecker et al., 2018, p.27 
Remaining challenges 
Indonesia is being urged to increase the level of ambition of its carbon emission targets 
and to expand renewable energy production (Climate Action Tracker, 2020; Chrysolite et 
al., 2017; As the world’s fifth-largest emitter of greenhouse gases, the country’s commitments 
will be critical to meeting global climate targets (Chrysolite et al., 2017). While energy does 
feature as a priority for the government’s climate policies, emissions from deforestation and 
peatland megafires have been a leading focus given their large share in the country’s carbon 
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emissions. Multilateral institutions and donors have also placed a significant emphasis on 
deforestation and peatland conversation with Indonesia being a leading country in REDD+ 
activities, a framework under the Paris Agreement in which higher-income countries pay lower-
income countries to protect their forests.  
The energy sector is predicted to become the country’s leading cause of carbon 
emissions in the next decade, replacing land-use changes and peat fires (Chrysolite et al., 
2017). Estimates from the World Resource Institute indicate that the country’s growing population 
and economy will lead to increased demand for energy, predicting the sector will become the 
leading contributor of carbon emission between 2026-2027 (Chrysolite et al., 2017). Chrysolite et 
al., (2017) recommend Indonesia introduce “a carbon tax on fossil-fuel power plants, replac[e] 
new development of coal power plants with clean and renewable energy sources (wind or solar), 
and provid[e] subsidies and better feed in tariffs for promoting renewable energy sources.  
Mozambique 
Mozambique’s high poverty and low energy access rates mean that the country’s energy 
needs are likely to increase significantly to meet social and economic targets set by the 
UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Mozambique has one of the lowest per capita 
CO2 emissions rates in the world at 0.28 tonnes in 2018 compared to the global average of 4.79 
tonnes in 2018 and the African average of 1.1 tonnes (Ritchie & Roser, 2019). Recent 
investments in Mozambique’s extractive sector, particularly coal and new offshore gas 
discoveries, are likely to have positive effects on energy access and livelihoods, although are 
also likely to increase CO2 emissions (Power & Kirshner, 2018). These investments have spurred 
growth in a struggling economy and created jobs in construction, manufacturing and services 
(World Bank, 2017). Perspectives on a just transition in Mozambique are likely to pose significant 
challenges where proposals are perceived to threaten the recent economic gains that 
Mozambique has gained from carbon-intensive industries. That being said, the policy 
environment for actions to tackle climate change has been deemed favourable in Mozambique 
as demonstrated by the country’s positive response to the UNFCCC process, relevant national 
policies and funding for climate change issues and mainstreaming these into local government 
programmes (Shankland & Chambote, 2011) 
Policy context 
Mozambique’s National Climate Adaptation and Mitigation Strategy (2013-2025) is 
intended to promote low-carbon development through the integration of adaptation and 
mitigation in sectoral and local planning (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Netherlands, p.7). 
Mozambique also submitted an INDC to the UNFCCC, which “highlights that the implementation 
of any proposed reduction is conditional on the provision of financial, technological and capacity-
building support from the international community” (Netherlands, p.8). 
International donors have played a significant role in shaping “the landscape of energy 
politics” in Mozambique (Power et al., 2016). “Reflecting the high levels of aid dependence in 
Mozambique’s, off-grid rural electrification and grid extension has frequently been funded by 
grants and soft loans from European bilateral donors who have played a key role in configuring 
the landscape of energy politics and closely shaped the Mozambican state’s capacity to pursue 
different renewable energy pathways” (Power et al., 2016, p. 16). 
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Participation in Mozambique’s just transition 
The energy sector has been highly politicised in Mozambique, with the expansion of 
electricity access into remote area seen as an extension of state power and allegations of 
corruption in the awarding of energy contracts to companies with political ties (Power et 
al., 2016). Critiques of the government’s energy policies by civil society organisations are centred 
around “the Mozambican government’s failure to uphold its resource sovereignty, locally 
redistribute the wealth generated by hydrocarbon revenues, create jobs for local populations in 
coal-producing areas, or negotiate favourable terms with investors” (Power et al. 2016). 
There is a dearth of information on participation and key stakeholders in Mozambique’s 
energy transition. As noted above, very little research has been conducted on energy transition 
processes outside high-income countries, that the few studies conducted in lower-income 
settings have tended to be in a limited set of upper-middle income countries.  
Achievements towards just transition 
Mozambique’s National Energy Fund (FUNAE) has been supporting renewable energy 
development through solar PV systems, mini-hydro and wind projects (Power et al., 2019, 
p. 511). “The agency is funded through the state budget, with revenues from taxes and levies 
from petroleum and electricity concessions, along with donor support from the World Bank, the 
EU, several European bilateral donors, and more recently, India” (Power et al., 2019, p.511). 
There is limited evidence on the effectiveness of these programmes, but Power et al. (2019) note 
that this extension of energy provision to underserviced areas has been seen to benefit rural 
wellbeing, particularly through provision to rural schools and clinics.  
Remaining challenges 
Lack of coordination among ministries responsible for climate change mitigation in 
Mozambique has been cited as a leading barrier to effective energy transition (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2018). Key responsibilities for implementing energy policies have shifted 
between ministries and some ministries have been dissolved, placing a significant burden on 
remaining industries. To address this shortfall in coordination, a Climate Change Unit was 
established in 2014 to serve as a cross-governmental body to coordinate climate-related 
activities (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018, p.8) 
Displacement due to mining development has been highly problematic in Mozambique 
with the government found to be inadequately addressing the needs of local communities 
affected by natural resource extraction (Varia, 2013). Tete province, for example, has been 
the site of significant coal production with approximately 60% of the province’s area either 
approved or pending approval for mining concessions (Varia, 2013). Thousands of people have 
been resettled due to coal mine developments, access roads and related infrastructure, with and 
Human Rights Watch report finding that “the resettlements, particularly the provision of poor-
quality agricultural land and unreliable access to water, have had negative impacts on community 
members’ standard of living, including rights to food, water, and work” (Varia, 2013). 
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South Africa 
Although South Africa has made limited progress, it is one of the few lower-income 
countries recognised for having adopted explicit steps towards a just energy transition. 
South Africa has strong environmental reasons for raising the share of renewables in the energy 
mix: its carbon emissions per capita are twice the global average and it has the joint highest per 
capita CO2 emissions in Africa at 8.09 tonnes in 2018, compared to the African average of 1.1 
tonnes (Ritchie & Roser, 2019). Around 77% of South Africa’s primary energy needs rely on coal 
and South Africa is the seventh-largest coal exporter globally (IEA, 2020b). It is reported that 
business, the government and trade unions continue to have an interest in the competitiveness 
of coal production, most notably ESKOM, the state-owned energy supplier and the largest 
producer of electricity in Africa (Schmitz, 2017, pp 521-540). The coal industry employed an 
estimated 92,230 people in 2019 (Minerals Council of South Africa, 2020), largely in the 
Mpumalanga region. Nonetheless, the role of coal in the South African economy and power 
generation is already decreasing, while that of gas and renewables is increasing (IEA Outlook, 
2020). The decommissioning of coal power plants due to age, and the steps taken to reduce 
reliance on coal internationally, are expected to have an impact on South African energy 
transition (Bridle, 2019).   
Policy context 
South Africa explicitly articulated the need for a just transition for all in its National 
Climate Change Response white paper in 2012 (UNFCC, 2016). The National Development 
Plan, launched the same year, set out a commitment to “produce sufficient energy to support 
industry at competitive prices, ensuring access for poor households, while reducing carbon 
emissions per unit of power by about one-third” (National Planning Commission, 2012, p.34). The 
Plan also referred to managing a just transition in the context of protecting the poor and 
vulnerable to health-related risks of climate change and with reference to the high number of 
workers in the energy sectors. It stated that “an equitable transition must protect the poor and 
vulnerable from the transitional costs associated with mitigation, such as increased costs of 
energy, food and transport, job losses in carbon intensive industries, and the demand for 
different skills” (National Planning Commission, 2012, p.211). 
Another key intervention relating to South Africa’s commitment to just transition is the 
Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme (REIPPPP). 
Established in 2010, the programme has been described as one of South African government’s 
urgent interventions to enhance the country’s power generation capacity with 17.8 GW of 
electricity generation capacity from renewables over an 18-year period to 2030 (Walwyn & Brent, 
2015). The REIPPP lists several targeted interventions for local economic development including 
job creation, rural development (especially in disadvantaged regions), community participation, 
skills, education and enterprise development and the participation of previously disadvantaged 
citizens (Walwyn & Brent, 2015, p.395) 
Participation in South Africa’s just transition 
One of the most explicit just transition social dialogue instruments in the global South is 
South Africa’s Green Economy Accord. The accord is aimed at developing local industrial 
capacity in the green sector and creating new green jobs while including key stakeholders in the 
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process (UNFCC, 2016, p. 41). The accord, signed in 2011 by several government departments, 
representative trade unions and employers’ organizations, and civil society organizations, was 
characterised by President Zuma as “one of the most comprehensive social partnerships on the 
green economy in the world” and “ground-breaking” by a leading South African trade unionist 
(Amis et al., 2018, p.13) Amis et al. (2018) argue, however, that despite some progress in 
providing green job and employment, the Accord has “not helped unlock change in areas which 
were needed. In the end, it was more of a public relations exercise” (p.13)   
There is a growing demand for shifts away from fossil fuel production and consumption in 
South Africa, though tensions persist around potential job losses and the closure of coal 
mines and coal power stations (Morena et al., 2018). While the government and private sector 
have been largely pursuing market-based approaches to just energy transition, an alliance of 
labour, social movements and popular organizations called One Million Climate Jobs Campaign 
has put forward an alternative vision for just energy transition that: 
“calls for a much more radical approach including departure from the market-liberal 
development pathway and towards a public sector-led transition…Following the 
suggested path would strengthen the role of local governments in increasing energy 
equity and access and would also create decent jobs. It could also serve to support a 
democratic transition away from fossil fuel capitalism that is built from the bottom up.” 
          (Morena et al., 2018, p.25) 
Achievements towards just transition 
Direct employment in projects under South Africa’s REIPPPP more than doubled from 17 
800 job-years in 2014 to 36 500 by mid-2018 (IRENA, 2019). The REIPPP has contributed to 
the emergence of South Africa’s small but growing wind and solar manufacturing industries and 
many direct and indirect job. Some 85% of jobs were created in the construction phase, the 
remainder in operations, and the majority are held by people from local communities (IRENA, 
2019). Evidence from the World Bank indicates that there have been measurable benefits to rural 
communities in South Africa owing to the REIPPP, going so far as to characterise the 
programme as “the most successful public-private partnership in Africa in the last 20 years” 
(World Bank, 2014).  
Remaining challenges 
Policy consistency has been identified as a major challenge to implementing South 
Africa’s policies in support of a just transition (Morena et al. 2018, p. 25). For example, 
contrary to the stated objectives around divestment from fossil fuels noted above, the South 
Africa Department of Mineral Resources and Energy recently stated that the country’s reliance 
on coal was “unlikely to change significantly in the next two decades owing to the relative lack of 
suitable alternatives to coal as an energy source” (DMRE, 2020). These inconsistencies, in the 
already complex domain of energy transition, can make it harder for key stakeholders to 
comprehend or comply with policies. An engineer in the renewable energy sector was quoted by 
Power et al. (2016) as stating that “meeting the economic commitments of the project can be a 
huge challenge… not all developers will coordinate with each other over labour and socio-
economic issues as the industry is too competitive”.  
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A widely reported challenge to the implementation of fossil fuel divestment strategies 
comes from the disproportionately large role of private sector stakeholders’ influence in 
decisions around energy (Power et al., 2016; Morris & Martin,2015). Morris & Martin (2015) 
note that the incentives to develop renewables originated in the electricity crisis in 2007 and 
ESKOM’s inability to promptly respond to continued high demand for energy since. Morris & 
Martin (2015) concluded that ESKOM had been able to use its own failure in meeting energy 
needs to reassert its control over the electricity value chain.  
4. Leading issues for Just Energy Transitions in LICs and 
MICs 
This section briefly summarises some common issues highlighted by cross- country studies of 
just transitions in LICs and MICs and draws on the findings from the country cases studies 
included in this report.  
Policy coherence and communication 
Evaluations of energy transitions in the case study countries discussed in this report all 
noted a lack of policy coherence as a leading barrier to progress. This includes failures to 
coordinate policy commitments and activities across government ministries, incompatible policies 
between fossil fuel and renewable energy development, and ineffective communications 
strategies towards businesses, civil society and the wider public. While there is limited evidence 
on effective policy coherence in just transitions in LICs and MICs, one area that has been 
explored in more detail is the coordination and communication of fuel subsidy reforms in Egypt 
and Indonesia. Both countries were found to have had well-coordinated policies that aligned with 
complimentary social protection programmes to mitigate negative effects on poor households. 
These policies were also found to have adopted effective communications strategies, 
acknowledging the challenges or ‘sacrifice’ involved in fossil fuel divestment but focusing on the 
net social benefits from diverted investment in social sectors.  
Decentralised decision-making and policy coherence is widely recognised as a necessary 
dimension of just transitions to complement comprehensive national energy planning. 
Localised challenges and opportunities inherent in shifting away from fossil fuels mean that 
tailored interventions and local-level dialogue to ensure all affected stakeholders are included in 
energy decision-making. 
“National mandates and plans to address just transitions can be necessary to spur and 
support local action in some cases. But for just transitions to work, the process needs to 
be owned at the local or regional level, not merely in the climate change-oriented 
discussion among multilaterals and central governments. Cities and regional 
governments will be on the front lines of dealing with transitions, but they often lack the 
political power and institutional capacity to plan and manage broad systemic changes 
and commonly do not have a clear sense of roles and responsibilities. In some instances, 
national legislation significantly curtails the options of very capable local governments. 
Local governments also lack access to finance on the scale required to manage worker 
displacements and fund new adjustment programs, worker retraining, and other social 
insurance.”  
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          (CSIS, 2020) 
Participation 
Social dialogue with active and informed participation of affected stakeholders is a 
leading challenge to just transition in the case studies reviewed by this report and also in 
a number of other cross country-studies (Zinecker et al., Worrall et al., 2018). Worrall et al. 
argue that “The main obstacles to effective social dialogue appear to be the absence of platforms 
or engagement with subnational governments, civil society and business around policy (2018, 
p.12). Their cross-country analysis found that some countries engaged civil society when 
developing their INDCs (Nigeria, Philippines, Viet Nam) while other countries did not (China, 
Pakistan). In some countries,  
In those countries where social dialogue platforms do exist, it is widely recognised that 
inequalities in different stakeholders’ abilities to influence decision-making are critical 
barriers to realising just outcomes. Worrall et al.’s (2018) cross country study found that fossil 
fuel energy agencies hold more power in Indonesia, India and Nigeria than renewable energy 
entities. The case study of South Africa also shows that the coal industry has a disproportionate 
impact on energy decision-making compared to the renewable energy sector. Worrall et al. 
(2018) note that the exclusion of workers and civil society actors from just transition dialogues is 
in step with the wider global trend of the erosion of works rights and voices and lack of union 
representation. Barriers to participation are therefore critical, but not unique to just transition 
dialogues, indicating that more systemic reforms to workers’ inclusion in the political landscape 
may be needed.   
Gender inequalities 
Gender inequalities are a critical factor in just energy transitions to ensure access to 
clean energy for all. Differences in energy needs among women and men, largely a function of 
societal norms that result in different responsibilities, have resulted in inequitable access to 
energy services between men and women (CSIS, 2020; ENERGIA, 2019). While the gendered-
dimension of energy poverty is generally discussed in international fora, national energy plans 
rarely address the specific needs of women. The IUCN-Global Gender Office found that only 
one-third of national energy frameworks include gender considerations (SEforALL, 2017). 
Furthermore, a cross-country analysis of the gender dimensions of just energy transitions by 
ENERGIA (2019) found that “even in cases where gender-aware policy is in place, the 
implementation may lag behind, mainly because of the approaches adopted and processes 
within the organisation implementing the policy”.  
Inequalities in access to employment in the energy sector have also be identified as an 
important factor to be addressed as part of just transitions (ENERGIA, 2019; ILO, 2018; 
IRENA, 2018,). Women’s participation in labour markets is lower in LICs and MICs in general, 
and the energy sector is one of many that has lost out on the potential skills, productivity and 
innovation of women, as well as perpetuated damaging norms in hiring practices and training. 
Research by IRENA found that gender discrimination tends to be lower in renewable than non-
renewable energy sectors in the countries they studied (IRENA, 2018). While there are global 
initiatives in place to address women’s employment as a ‘transformational’ element of energy 
transitions, there has been limited engagement among LICs and MICS. For example, the Clean 
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Energy, Education, and Empowerment (C3E) initiative, launched in 2010 to “enhance 
collaboration and promote the participation of women in the clean energy transformation.” has 
had no LICs or MICs as members to date (CEM, 2020).  
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